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LEGAL ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY: IN DEFENSE OF
MANUFACTURING UNCERTAINTY, DECONSTRUCTING
EXPERTISE AND OTHER TRIAL STRATEGIES
DAVID S. CAUDILL*
A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has
an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force.
Performance of that duty .... however, is qualified by the ...
duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer
... is not required.., to vouch for the evidence submitted in a
cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by...
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.1
S UCH a minimal ethical standard-all evidence that is not known to be
false, including evidence reasonably believed to be false, 2 can be
presented-appears appropriate and justifiable in an adversary system.
Advocates resolve doubts in favor of their client's accounts of events, offer
interpretations of events that serve their client's position and do the best
they can under the circumstances to present their client's version of the
controverted facts. 3 Our comfort with such strategies is consistent with
our sense that there usually are two sides to every story, and objective truth
is hard to come by. After all,journalists have a perspective in their report-
ing, historians impose interpretations on historical materials, politicians
utilize "spin" and so forth. As to scientific evidence, however, we tend to
expect more knowledge and less perspective, interpretation, and spin-a
scientific expert is not in the same category as a fallible eyewitness or an
interested party telling a story. In principle, then, "falsity" should be more
detectable when an expert's opinion is supposed to be based on estab-
lished methodological conventions and carefully collected data. And if
"falsity" is more detectable, then attorneys often know (or should know,
such that they may be deemed to know) when their expert's scientific testi-
mony is false and that it cannot be ethically proffered. This line of think-
* J.D., Ph.D., Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law,
Villanova University School of Law. The author is grateful to Daniel Brewer, 2008
J.D. candidate, for his research assistance, and to Professor Dorothy-A. Brown,
director of the Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University School
of Law, for making the Center available for research during the summer of 2006.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2006).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (a) (3) ("A lawyer may refuse
to offer evidence ... that the lawyer reasonably believes is false," which indirectly
confirms that a lawyer may offer evidence reasonably believed to be false).
3. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 4-7
(3d ed., 2004).
(953)
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ing is adopted by those who claim that lawyers who present 'junk science"
violate the rule prohibiting presentation of false evidence.
4
In the policy context, where legislation and rule-making often rely on
scientific insights, there is a perennial concern that interested parties use
and abuse scientific arguments for their political and economic advan-
tage-examples include the strategies of manufacturing uncertainty to
curb regulation, of deconstruction of inconvenient scientific evidence and
of narrowly defining and then demanding "sound science" as a prerequi-
site for protective legislation.5 There is even concern about the Daubert-
ization of the regulatory arena-the importation of courtroom guidelines
for reliability as a strategy to raise the standard for scientific evidence in
policy decisions.6 Without entering that fray, I want to consider the re-
verse phenomenon-the new discourse concerning the use of the strate-
gies mentioned above (manufacturing uncertainty, deconstruction and
demands for "sound science") in the context of litigation. Interestingly,
even the so-called Daubert motion, challenging expertise prior to trial, can
be seen as a questionable trial strategy in some cases. My focus with re-
spect to each of these strategies is whether they serve as examples of un-
ethical conduct. My conclusion, somewhat reluctantly since these
strategies are nothing to be proud of, is that they do not. I also conclude,
however, that these strategies only work because of, and only in those cases
in which judges adopt, an overly idealized vision of the scientific
enterprise.
I. THE ETHICS OF PRESENTING AND ATTACKING EXPERT TESTIMONY
In retaining an expert witness, a lawyer should respect the integ-
rity of the expert's professional practices and procedures, and
should refrain from asking or encouraging the expert to violate
the integrity of those practices and procedures for purposes of
the particular matter for which the expert has been retained.
7
Some of the rules of professional conduct regarding expert witnesses
are straightforward and clear, such as the prohibition against payment of a
contingency fee to an expert.8 Other rules seem straightforward and
4. For a further discussion of this claim, see infra notes 24-26 and accompany-
ing text.
5. For a further discussion of manufacturing uncertainty, the deconstruction
of evidence and the demands of sound science, see infra notes 39-76 and accompa-
nying text.
6. See Symposium, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 2003, passim (discussing extension of Daubert into regulatory arena).
7. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF PRETRIAL CONDUCT § 11(b)
(2002). The Code of Pretrial Conduct "is merely a guide for trial lawyers and
should not ... form the bases for disciplinary proceedings or sanctions not called
for under the controlling law." Id. at § 12.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 ("The common law rule
in mostjurisdictions is that it is improper to pay... an expert witness a contingent
fee.").
[Vol. 52: p. 953
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clear, such as the prohibition against assisting a witness to testify falsely,9
but can become murky in practice. Steven Lubet explains:
[T]here may be a temptation to view the expert as simply an-
other member of the team who can be enlisted to provide
whatever advocacy is necessary. Thus, it is not unknown for attor-
neys to attempt to persuade experts to alter the content of their
opinions. This is wrong .... The entire system of expert testi-
mony rests upon the assumption that experts are independent of
the retaining attorneys. 10
Immediately, however, Lubet qualifies his remarks, confirming that
"it is not unethical to assist an expert to prepare for trial," which might
include advice "to use powerful language, to avoid jargon, to use analo-
gies, to refrain from long narratives, or to use other means that will help
her convey her opinion accurately".' I Such assistance will obviously "alter
the content" of the opinion in some sense, but we know what Lubet
means-alteration is a matter of degree, and it would be unethical to try
to persuade an expert to offer an opinion that is false.
In terms of comparative law, Lubet mentions:
[in] many countries it is considered unethical for a lawyer to
even meet alone with a witness prior to the trial, such is the aver-
sion to the possibility for contamination of the testimony. In the
United States, however, we take a far different view [-] it is gen-
erally considered incompetent for a lawyer to fail to meet with
and prepare a witness in advance of. . . testimony' 2
Geoffrey Hazard, for example, notes that in the English system, "the
barrister is insulated from the case" by having "no continuing relation with
any client," by using solicitors as intermediaries and by a strong identifica-
tion "as an officer of the court and as a gatekeeper concerning what kind
of evidence will be offered."1 3 A prominent Australian barrister recently
told me that he considered -the US. practice of rehearsing expert testi-
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b).
10. LUBET, supra note 3, at 256.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 78-79.
13. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 131 (1978).
[I]t seems evident that if the stakes in a lawsuit are substantial . . . , and if
the parties are authorized to give evidence as to what the truth is, the
parties will distort their submissions to the maximum extent possible.
The artistry and self-consciousness of the distortion will of course vary
There is much ambivalence concerning the advocate's responsibility in
this respect. The rules clearly say that ... the advocate may not assist his
client in . . . fabricating or suppressing evidence. In practice, lawyers
often wind up violating these rules, some of them quite frequently.
Id. at 130.
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mony to be inappropriate. 14 As to preparation of expert reports prior to
trial, a 1999 survey of Australian judicial perspectives on expert evidence
confirmed that over half of the judges responding to the question of
whether lawyers had participated in the composition of reports thought
that it happened occasionally (one in five thought it happened often); one
judge had "little faith in expert's reports which are really the work of solic-
itors/counsel," while another could not "imagine any other reality in an
adversarial system ofjustice."15 Indeed, it is hard to imagine lawyers in the
U.S. foregoing active participation in the preparation of expert reports.
The ethical rules regarding cross-examination of an opposing expert
witness are likewise not particularly clear, even though Steven Lubet
claims that "certain ethical principles have developed that circumscribe a
lawyer's use of cross examination."' 6 On the basis of Rule 3.4(e) of the
American Bar Association (A.B.A.) Rules, which prohibits alluding "to any
matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will
not be supported by admissible evidence," 17 Lubet argues that questions
must have a "good faith" basis in fact and law. 18 Rule 3.4(e) also prohibits
asserting "personal knowledge of facts in issue" or stating "a personal opin-
ion as to the justness of a cause [or] the credibility of a witness," thus
Lubet warns against "Do you know... ?" questions. Beyond those guide-
lines, Lubet goes on to say (without citation) that it "is unethical to ask
questions that are intended solely to harass, degrade, or humiliate a wit-
ness .... 1 9 Lubet then asks:
To what extent may cross examination be used to discredit the
testimony of a witness whom counsel knows to be telling the
truth? ... The rule is less certain in civil cases [than in criminal
cases, where a "discrediting cross is an additional safeguard"]. It
is clear, however, that a witness cannot be degraded or debased
to cast doubt on otherwise unchallenged testimony. On the
14. Conversation with Jeffrey Sher, Q.C., in Melbourne, Austl. (July 13, 2006).
15. See IAN FRECKELTON, PRASUNA REDDY, & HUGH SELBY, AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERT EVIDENCE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 42 (1999). Interestingly,
the judges surveyed were divided as to whether involvement by lawyers in expert
reports helped or hindered the "weight" of the report. See id. (noting 40.22% said
process helped, 28.14% said process hindered and 34.64% said it made no differ-
ence). The authors of the survey noted that Lord Denning in an English Court of
Appeal case, Whitehouse v. Jordon, [1980] 1 All E.R. 650, 655 (A.C.), commented:
[The] joint report suffers to my mind from the way it was prepared. It
was the result of long conferences between the two professors and coun-
sel in London and it was actually "settled" by counsel. In short, it wears
the colour of special pleading rather than an impartial report. Whenever
counsel "settles" a document, we know how it goes. "We had better put
this in," "We had better leave this out" and so forth.
Id. at 41.
16. See LUBET, supra note 3, at 145.
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e).
18. See LUBET, supra note 3, at 146.
19. Id. at 147.
956 [Vol. 52: p. 953
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other hand, true factual information may be used to undermine
the credibility of a witness whose testimony is legitimately
controverted. 2 °1
I suspect that the situations where a cross-examiner knows that an
opposing expert is telling the truth, where the expert's testimony is un-
challenged, where there is no legitimate controversy and where "degrad-
ing" a witness has no purpose other than harassment, are rare. In most
situations, therefore, there appears to be no specific ethical restrictions on
cross-examination other than the prohibitions against irrelevant (or base-
less) questions and offering personal reflections on the testimony.
Finally, the rules regarding an attorney's offer of evidence, and the
corresponding duty to "cull inadmissible evidence from the case,"2 1 are
particularly problematic. Lubet's analysis is once again both compelling
and ambiguous:
There is no question that counsel may offer any evidence that
she believes is either clearly or probably admissible. What about
evidence that is probably inadmissible?
... It is ethical to offer any evidence over which there is a
reasonable evidentiary dispute....
... A corollary ... is the obligation to refrain from offering
evidence for which there is no reasonable basis. [Under Rule
3.4(e),] the adversary system does not extend so far as to allow
the intentional use of improper evidence ....
When does counsel have a reasonable belief as to the admis-
sibility of evidence? This determination lies within the thought
processes of the individual lawyer . ... 22
Whether by alluding "to any matter that will not be supported by ad-
missible evidence" (Rule 3.4(e)), by presenting evidence known to be false
(Rule 3.3(a)(3)) or by making frivolous claims or contentions (Rule 3.1),
an attorney can violate the ethical rules, but the prerequisites are, respec-
tively, no reasonable belief in admissibility, personal knowledge of falsity
and no good faith basis at all for a claim or contention. With respect to
scientific testimony, unless an attorney's expert states that his or her testi-
mony will be absolutely erroneous, it is difficult to see how these rules can
be violated in practice.2 3
20. Id.
21. See id. at 294.
22. Id. at 294-95.
23. I do offer examples of violations in David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses,
and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is there an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert's
Testimony?, 39 IDAIHO L. REV. 341, 345-47 (2003) (noting that where expert testifies
differently in different trials or where expert suddenly changes mind to help cli-
ent, counsel is alerted to falsity).
2007]
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Some, however, would disagree. One commentator argued that Rule
3.4's prohibition against falsifying evidence "forbids an attorney to permit
an expert witness to testify as an expert in a field that is not scientifically
valid."2 4 I suppose that is true with respect to sorcery, alchemy or astrol-
ogy, but the idea that counsel recognizes scientific validity is troubling to
me. Likewise, I am troubled by Dick Thornburgh's argument that "it is
unethical lawyers who are largely to blame for 'junk science:"'
It is clear that the lawyer does have a duty to determine whether
he believes expert testimony will be admissible before trying to
introduce such evidence in court .... To be an effective advo-
cate, the lawyer must.., test the accuracy and reliability of...
expert testimony ... he wishes to introduce.
25
My problem with Thornburgh's otherwise compelling argument is
that Rule 3.3 already permits an attorney to offer evidence that is reasona-
bly believed (but not known) to be false, which by definition is neither
accurate nor reliable. The commentary following Rule 3.3 is clear that an
attorney does not vouch for submitted evidence, but that is precisely what
Thornburgh asks attorneys to do. Knowing that Rule 3.3 provides no basis
for his argument, Thornburgh turns to Rule 3.1 (prohibiting frivolous
claims and contentions) and characterizes the introduction of expert testi-
mony as a claim or contention of law (as to admissibility) and fact (as to
reliability). Again, Rule 3.1 does not require a belief that one will prevail
or that facts be fully substantiated, but that is precisely what Thornburgh
requires. The disconnect between Thornburgh's thesis and the rules of
professional conduct has its source in the popular perception that when
two scientific experts disagree, one is ajunk scientist and one is telling the
truth. Rather than seeing theories in conflict, Thornburgh sees junk sci-
ence in conflict with genuine science, and asks why attorneys do not sim-
ply admit it if they are peddling junk science. His well-worn proposal for
court-appointed experts, to ensure neutral and disinterested expertise, be-
trays an idealized view of "science as a reservoir of determinable facts."2 6
A similar analysis is offered by Professors Fred Zacharias and Bruce
Green in their article entitled Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics.2 7 The au-
thors explore the persistent tension between two competing views of advo-
cacy-namely the advocate as a hired gun entirely devoted to the client,
versus the advocate as guided by personal conscience and moral self-re-
24. Justin P. Murphy, Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where are the Ethics?, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 230 (2000).
25. Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25
FORDHAM UPB. LJ. 449, 449, 462 (1998).
26. See SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 211 (1995).
27. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2005) (discussing tension between competing views of
advocacy).
958 [Vol. 52: p. 953
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straint-neither of which is ever fully embraced by the legal profession. 28
Rather than conceiving professional regulation as a mere compromise of
the two, Zacharias and Green argue that a coherent conception of advo-
cacy ethics is reflected in professional regulation of attorneys, and that it
has its origins in the mid-nineteenth century views of John Bannister Gib-
son, a chiefjustice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.2 9 Justice Gibson's
seemingly archaic notions of "professional conscience," lawyers' obliga-
tions to pursue appropriate goals, lawyers' personal rights and systemic
imperatives toward maintaining public respect for lawyers arguably antici-
pated and justify contemporary limits on advocacy. 30
Zacharias and Green distinguish between "relatively clear, categori-
cal" professional obligations (e.g., avoiding fraud or frivolous claims) and
discretionary rules (e.g., an advocate may refrain from offering testimony
believed but not known to be false).3 1 As to the second category, the prev-
alent view is
that lawyers are meant to have unbridled discretion .... as a
matter of personal conscience[, and] it does not matter what
choice the lawyer makes. The alternative [view], which reflects
Justice Gibson's conception, is that the rules presuppose that law-
yers will exercise professional conscience. . . . [and] strive to
strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests
.... If a lawyer fails to exercise this professional conscience, he
abuses his discretion.
32
Zacharias and Green offer as an example (of discretion requiring the
exercise of professional conscience) a "lawyers' discretion regarding the
introduction of seemingly false testimony."33 That is a situation
28. See id. at 2-4 (stating that "hired gun" conception is arguably dominant).
29. See id. at 4-5 (noting that Gibson believed "an advocate was required to
behave with all due fidelity to the court as well as the client"). The authors focus
their analysis on Justice Gibson's opinion in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845), a
slander suit brought by lawyer Rush against his former client Cavenaugh for calling
Rush a "cheat." Rush had undertaken a prosecution (on Cavenaugh's behalf) for
forgery, but Rush withdrew the charge and insisted he was entitled to compensa-
tion. Ajury found for Rush, and in upholding the verdict, Justice Gibson held that
Rush's conduct was entirely proper-Rush had withdrawn the forgery charge once
Rush was persuaded that the forgery accusation was false: "The high and
honourable office of a counsel would be degraded ... were he compelled to do
the biddings of his client against the dictates of his conscience." Rush, 2 Pa. at 189.
30. Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 36.
31. See id. at 51.
32. Id. at 52. The authors note that complete personal discretion is some-
times allowed, such as the rule permitting (but not requiring) a lawyer for an indi-
gent client to pay for court costs-the "permanent interests at stake are those of
the lawyers," and "public interests and client rights do not have a strong claim." Id.
at 53.
33. Id.
20071 959
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where the most compelling interests are those of the public and
the client, and where those interests are at odds. It would be
anomalous to conclude that the existence of this tension justifies
authorizing lawyers to resolve the tension without reference to
the underlying interests of the public or the client, based on the
lawyer's own interests, beliefs, or values.3 4
While some provisions of the ethical code contemplate recourse to
personal discretion, such as the discretion to refuse representation, others
require a professional, considered decision in light of the multiple inter-
ests that lawyers serve. 35 Therefore,
a lawyer should not adopt a policy of introducing into evidence
all helpful testimony unless he is certain that it is false. The rule
permitting the lawyer to refuse to introduce potentially false evi-
dence imposes a professional obligation on the lawyer to con-
sider how likely the testimony is to be false, the impact of the
testimony on the fact finder, and the impact on the client's rights
if the testimony is withheld.3 6
A lawyer preparing to introduce shaky expert testimony might first
stop to consider the likelihood of its falsity. Such an obligation is already
implied by the language of the rule regarding evidence "reasonably be-
lieved" (but not known) to be false37 -the lawyer's doubt must be reasona-
ble, and lawyers cannot rely on blissful ignorance that could easily be
corrected. 38 Likewise, the lawyer might stop to consider the impact of the
testimony on the fact-finder. But the prohibition against misleading the
tribunal is limited to evidence known to be false-to worry about mislead-
ing the jury with shaky evidence would place the attorney in a policing
role reminiscent of Thornburgh's proposal, an expansion that perhaps
Zacharias and Green would like to see. The third consideration, however,
regarding the impact on the client's rights if the testimony is withheld,
may put the attorney back in the position of offering shaky expert testi-
mony that is important for the client's cause, with the added benefit of
having made a professional, considered exercise of discretion consistent
with advocacy ethics. In the end, at least with respect to expert testimony,
it is not clear that Zacharias and Green would be satisfied with professional
discretion that allowed attorneys to give more weight to clients' interests
over public interests.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 54-55 (noting modern codes identify both personal and profes-
sional discretion).
36. Id. at 56.
37. Caudill, supra note 23, at 344-48.
38. For a further discussion of the A.B.A.'s Model Rule 3.3, see supra notes 1-2
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52: p. 953
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With the foregoing ethical guidelines and arguments in mind, I turn
next to an ethical evaluation of four questionable trial strategies: (1) man-
ufacturing uncertainty; (2) deconstructing evidence; (3) demanding
"sound science;" and (4) abuse of the Daubert motion.
II. IN [RELUCTANT] DEFENSE OF [QUESTIONABLE] TRIAL STRATEGIES
A. Manufacturing Uncertainty
Ironically, science may be its own worst enemy when it comes to
Daubert, [epidemiologist David M.] Michaels observes. Scientists
love to keep questioning things, and that inquisitiveness makes
judges nervous. 'You can manufacture uncertainty because
scientists don't always agree," he explains. "Lawyers take differ-
ences among scientist and magnify them, and as long as there is
any sort of disagreement, the case does not move forward."
39
The discourse concerning "manufactured uncertainty" is usually asso-
ciated with the regulatory arena. David Michaels and Celeste Monforton,
for example, observe that when new health and environmental "regula-
tions are being considered, opponents raise the issue of scientific uncer-
tainty no matter how powerful or conclusive the evidence." 4 The authors
offer examples, beginning with the aspirin industry's delay in providing
warning labels advising parents of the risk of Reye's Syndrome, despite the
publication of four studies that led the Centers for Disease Control to is-
sue an alert of that risk to the medical community:
Although the four studies were enough for the CDC to issue
warnings, the industry raised 17 specific "flaws" in the studies and
insisted that more reliable studies were needed ....
The aspirin manufactures did not invent the strategy of question-
ing the underlying science in order to prevent regulation; it had
been successfully employed for decades by polluters and produc-
ers of hazardous products. The strategy has now become .. .
common .... 41
Other examples include the tobacco industry's promotion of "doubt
and uncertainty" regarding the risks of lung cancer, heart disease and en-
vironmental tobacco smoke,42 and opposition to Occupational Safety and
39. Peg Brickley, Science v. Law: A Decade-Old Rule on Scientific Evidence Comes
Under Fire, Sci. Am., Dec. 2003, at 32.
40. David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested
Science and the Protection of the Public's Health and Environment, 95 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH
S39, S39 (Supp. July 2005).
41. Id.
42. Id. at S40. "The tobacco industry's goal was to promote scientific uncer-
tainty .... The tobacco industry recognized the value of magnifying the debate in
the scientific community on the cause-and-effect relationship between smoking
and lung cancer."
2007]
9
Caudill: Legal Ethics and Scientific Testimony: In Defense of Manufacturin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Health Administration regulations by employers (and their trade associa-
tions) on the basis that
the human data are not representative, the animal data are not
relevant, or the exposure data are incomplete or not reliable.
These assertions were often accompanied by the declaration that
more research is needed before protective action is justified.43
The authors conclude that "those charged with protecting the pub-
lic's health [should] recognize that the desire for absolute scientific cer-
tainty is both counter-productive and futile."44
Michaels and Monforton do not, however, limit their concerns with
"manufacturing uncertainty" to the federal rulemaking arena; the strategy
of "magnifying and exploiting uncertainties" is now applied in the context
of litigation, "constraining the ability of the judicial [system] to address
issues of... victim compensation." 45 The authors blame Daubert, in partic-
ular, for allowing judges to demand "a level of certainty that [is] virtually
impossible to provide." 46
It bears mention that Michaels and Monforton, in their attack on reg-
ulated industries that manage to manufacture uncertainty, acknowledge
that "[e]nvironmental activists can also be guilty of using the existence of
scientific uncertainty to advance policy aims . . ."47 Using the precaution-
ary principle, some zealous advocates for the environment demand cer-
tainty that an action will do no harm, which can delay and disparage
"scientific advances or public health interventions with the potential to
genuinely improve the human condition .... ,,48 And while all of the au-
thors' examples of manufactured uncertainty in litigation involve defen-
dant corporations, the strategy is equally available to plaintiffs. Consider,
for example, plaintiffs' attorney Dov Apfel's argument that in cerebral
43. See id. at S40-43.
44. Id. at S45. Scientific uncertainty, for example,
is inevitable in designing disease prevention programs. Scientists cannot
feed toxic chemicals to people, for example, to see what dose causes can-
cer; instead, we study the effects on laboratory animals, and we harness
the "natural experiments" where human exposures have already hap-
pened. Both epidemiologic and laboratory studies have many uncertain-
ties, and scientists must extrapolate from study-specific evidence to make
causal inferences and recommend protective measures. Absolute cer-
tainty is rarely an option.
Id. at S40.
45. See id.
46. See id. at S44. The authors offer the example of litigation over Parlodel, a
drug (to stop postpartum lactation) that allegedly caused heart attacks and strokes;
"when several women sued the drugs manufacturers, claiming Parlodel was respon-
sible for their illness, their cases were essentially thrown out of court for lack of
scientific certainty." Id. (citingJ.P. Kassiner &J.S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary
Standards for Medical Testimony, 288 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1382 (2002)).
47. See Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S39.
48. See id.
[Vol. 52: p. 953
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palsy cases, the defendants rely upon "four essential criteria" (published
by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists) that must be met before cerebral palsy can
be attributed to an interpretation event.
4 9
Defense experts offer the [four criteria] to support the proposi-
tion that most cases of cerebral palsy are caused by antepartum
events (before labor and delivery). However, the data on which
[the criteria] relies for this hypothesis is strongly contradicted. 50
Indeed, for Apfel, the "criteria provide a classic example of junk sci-
ence," and lawyers
representing brain-injured children must show the court that
[the] exclusive criteria are based on a distortion of the literature
and the available data and are nothing more than a litigation
tool to prevent legitimate claims from being considered by the
jury.5 1
Apfel quotes from Koval v. Kincheloe, where the trial judge refused to
be bound by the criteria because
the parties' arguments and authorities . . . suggest that there is
disagreement in the medical community regarding whether cere-
bral palsy can be shown to have been caused by an intrapartum
event of hypoxia and the factors which may indicate such
causation. 5
2
The plaintiffs in Koval therefore succeeded in manufacturing enough
uncertainty to challenge the science behind the criteria.
Without questioning at all either the flawed policy processes identi-
fied by Michaels and Monforton, or their concerns with "the organized
movement to extend Daubert's reach from the judiciary.., into the federal
rulemaking arena,"53 it is difficult to imagine a violation of the bar's mini-
malist ethical standards on the part of attorneys who "manufacture" suffi-
cient uncertainty to win a Daubert reliability challenge. There may be
problems with Daubert, or with judges, or with experts who claim that "the
evidence is inconclusive" even when "genuine scientific uncertainty does
49. See Dov Apfel, Keep junk Science' out of Cerebral Palsy Cases, TRiAL, May 2004,
at 46.
50. Id. at 51.
51. Id. at 46, 48.
52. Id. at 53 (citing Koval v. Kincheloe, No. CIV-99-1524-T, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24301, at *5 (N.D. Okla. 2001)).
53. Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S44 ("The legal, economic, and
political obstacles faced by regulators will increase dramatically when Daubert-like
criteria are applied to each piece of scientific evidence used to support a
regulation.").
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not exist,"54 or even a personal ethical dilemma on the part of an attorney
who does not want to help a corporation avoid liability for its products, but
there's no formal ethical problem unless the "manufacturing" attorney
knows that a proffered expert is lying. As Steven Lubet explains, "our ad-
versary system calls each attorney to make out the best case possible, and
relies upon the judge to rule on disputed issues of law." 55 Lubet also
points out that attorneys should not take comfort in erroneous judicial
rulings, or in an opposing counsel's failure to object, if improper evidence
is presented.5 6 "Indeed, one of the justifications for the adversary system
is precisely that counsel can be relied upon to perform this minimal level
of self-policing." 5 7 And it is minimal-unless the attorney knows that prof-
fered evidence is improper, i.e., knows to be false or misleading, then no
self-policing is required by the rules of professional conduct.
B. Deconstruction of Evidence
The term "deconstruction," famously associated with the late Jacques
Derrida and complex post-structuralist literary theory,58 has a relatively
simplistic meaning as a trial strategy. Pamela Hobbs, for example, in her
linguistic analysis of the cross-examination of an expert physician in a
medical malpractice case, demonstrates "how a cross-examining attorney
attempts to systematically dismantle the conceptual evidence that has been
54. See id. at S43 ("[A] lucrative business of science for hire has emerged.
Consultants in epidemiology, biostatistics, and toxicology are frequently engaged
by industries facing regulation to dispute data used by regulatory agencies in devel-
oping public health and safety standards.").
55. LUBET, supra note 3, at 294.
56. See id. at 295.
57. Id.
58. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L.
REv. 719 (2005). Balkin summarizes the origins of "deconstruction," as "a series of
techniques invented by Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and others to analyze liter-
ary and philosophical texts." See id. at 719. Literary texts, for example, can be
deconstructed to reveal the privileging of one pole of a conceptual opposition. See
id. at 723. The technique
has obvious applications to legal and policy argument .... Given a doc-
trinal or theoretical distinction between A and B, the legal scholar.., can
argue that the justifications for the distinction undermine themselves,
that categorical boundaries are unclear or at odds with the proffered jus-
tification, or that the boundaries shift radically as they are placed in new
contexts of judgment.
Id. at 724. While such a technique suggests a far more complex and sophisticated
sense of "deconstruction" than is typical in the discourse concerning challenges to
scientific expertise, Balkin identifies deconstruction with the argument "that struc-
tures of social meaning are always unstable, indeterminate, nonpermanent and
historically situated, constantly changing over time and accumulating new connec-
tions, associations and connections." See id. at 720. To the extent that deconstruc-
tion of an expert's evidence is intended to show that science and scientific
practices are unstable, highly interpretive, historically situated, and dynamic, then
the use of the term deconstruction in discussions of courtroom expertise is at least
associated with deconstruction as a literary-theoretical and critical-legal technique.
[Vol. 52: p. 953
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erected on direct examination .. .."59 Her point is that such "deconstruc-
tion" is actually a "construction" of "a competing version, or re-analysis, of
the evidence." 6 °
A more sophisticated sense of "deconstruction" has been popularized
by SheilaJasanoff, who links the terms to the notion of the "construction"
of science as understood by sociologists of science:
Through detailed descriptions of laboratory work and other
forms of scientific practice, researchers have shown that the pro-
duction of facts and bodies of knowledge is invariably embedded
in a matrix of social interactions, agreements, and understand-
ings. Scientific knowledge, according to these studies, must be
communally certified to be legitimate .... Negotiation within
and among scientific communities establishes the conventions
for acceptable research .... These observations are frequently
summarized in the statement that science is socially
constructed.6 1
The fact that "consensus in science is usually provisional and hardly
ever all-inclusive" facilitates courtroom battles of experts-scientific claims
can be "pulled apart, or deconstructed" by an opposing scientific expert
who sows doubts "about the reliability of particular scientific practices, the
adequacy or completeness of scientific interpretive frameworks, the com-
parative saliency of different kinds of evidence, and the credibility of com-
peting experts."62 Likewise, cross-examination offers opportunities for
deconstruction by "disclosing areas of uncertainty and interpretive con-
flict."63 Such efforts may be limited, however, by "a bias toward maintain-
ing the institutional authority of science even in these orgies of
deconstruction." 64 Cross-examination, typically, selectively targets
inconsistencies in the witness's testimony and ... biases, such as
ties to economic interests, that are considered important in com-
monsense tests of credibility. The technical practices of lawyer-
ing thus shore up a deeper commitment to the notion of science
as a reservoir of determinable facts. 65
59. See Pamela Hobbs, Tipping the Scales ofJustice: Deconstructing an Expert's Tes-
timony on Cross-Examination, 15 INT'LJ. SEMIoTIcs L. 411, 414 (2002).
60. See id.
61. See SheilaJasanoff, Research Subpoenas and the Sociology of Knowledge, 59 LAw
& COrrEMP. PROBS. 95, 98 (1996).
62. See id. at 100.
63. SeeJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 26, at 53.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 211.
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The weaknesses of the individual expert, rather than the "structurally
or institutionally conditioned contingences in scientific knowledge," are
the subject of scrutiny. 66
In any event, the strategy of "deconstruction" as described byJasanoff
has been identified as a potential problem in the policy context. Wendy
Wagner, in an article on the perils of interest group valuations of science,
argues that
[c]redible studies, traditional research methods, and respected
researchers ... may all be deconstructed if those judging or scru-
tinizing the science do not respect the vulnerable, socially con-
structed features of traditional research methods.
67
Wagner thus associates deconstruction with the disclosure of the
"constructedness" of science insofar as studies are based upon communal
and methodological conventions, consensus, assumptions and understand-
ings. 68 Further, Wagner locates the danger of such revelations in decision-
makers who are unaware of how science works and perhaps expect a more
perfect "mirror of nature" or representation of physical reality.6 9 Wagner
likewise suggests that trial judges hearing a Daubert challenge might also
lack knowledge of how science works, 70 but as
cross-examinations are as likely to lead to the deconstruction of
credible research, it is not obvious that Daubert increases the risk
of this counterproductive approach to reviewing science.
71
One might ask where the harm lies in deconstruction by reference to
science's social aspects, since that strategy is equally available to both sides
in a dispute. In the policy arena, Wagner suggests, deconstructing credi-
ble science that supports a needed regulatory program might make the
program disappear. In the litigation context, however, each side presents
evidence that can be deconstructed by the other side. Once the playing
66. See id.
67. See Wendy Wagner, The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scien-
tific Quality, 95 Am. J. PUB HEALTH S99, S102 (Supp. July 2005).
68. See id.
69. SeeJasanoff, Research Subpoenas, supra note 61, at 52.
Contradicting the logical positivists' view that science simply mirrors na-
ture, [the sociology of scientific knowledge] stresses the social factors that
go into the production of scientific knowledge. The authority of scien-
tific claims derives, according to the sociological account, not directly,
from the representation of physical reality, but indirectly, from the certifi-
cation of claims through a multitude of informal, often invisible, negotia-
tions among members of relevant disciplines.
Id.
70. See Wagner, supra note 67, at S103-04 ('Judges ... are not typically scien-
tists, and we know from the large body of critical literature and a growing number
of published opinions that they sometimes make decisions about science that are
wrong.").
71. See id. at S102.
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field is leveled by showing the "constructed" aspects of all science, then in
Daubert hearings and in cross-examinations attorneys can move on to other
targets.
From an ethical perspective, it is difficult to see how deconstruction
violates the rules of professional responsibility. Revealing the social as-
pects of science is not misleading in itself, although some idealistic judges
might view the exercise as a revelation that such science is unreliable-if
the science being offered by both sides is thereby called into question, that
could be a tactical advantage for the party with a weaker scientific argu-
ment. That situation may signal a problem with judicial understanding of
science, but there is not a violation of the prohibition against presenting
evidence known to be false.
C. Demands for "Sound Science"
Defenders of pollution and dangerous products often call for
policies and legal decisions to be based in "sound science." This
is a concept that is . . . rarely defined, but presumably signifies
the opposite of whatever has been labeled as junk science. 72
Carolyn Raffensperger and Nancy Myers, after noting that the phrases
"sound science" and "junk science" are "familiar to environmental advo-
cates," define "sound science" as "shorthand for a narrow definition of
what counts as scientific evidence." 73 Proponents demand reliance upon
epidemiology, dismiss animal studies and "require very high levels of con-
fidence before pronouncing a link between cause and effect," but this nar-
row definition
leaves out vast areas of scientific knowledge and inquiry and
many legitimate tools of investigation. Scientists themselves rely
on animal studies, models, systematic field observations, and
even casual observations as sources of knowledge-but "sound
science" advocates tend to discredit such knowledge. 74
The authors are concerned that "the tort system is being eroded by an
inappropriate reliance on overly stringent and specific scientific standards
in court judgments."7 5 The Daubert criteria for reliability are blamed for
encouraging, or at least permitting, 'judges to sift through evidence and
experts according to specific standards of 'sound science." 7 6
Again, if such problems exist, they do not implicate attorneys with
respect to the rules of professional conduct. Advocates who take advan-
72. Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S43.
73. See Carolyn Raffensperger & Nancy Myers, Detox for Torts: How to Bring
Justice Back to the Tort System (Part I), THE NETWORKER (Sci. & Envtl. Health Network,
Ames, Iowa), June 2003, at 3, available at http://www.sehn.org/Volume_8-3.html.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 4.
76. See id.
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tage of a judge's preference for a narrow view of reliability cannot be
blamed for misleading the court.
D. Daubert Motions as a Trial Tactic
A pre-trial Daubert hearing provides attorneys with the opportunity to
engage in all of the previously discussed strategies-manufacturing uncer-
tainty, deconstruction and demanding "sound science." Because of the
pejorative connotations surrounding each of these terms, there is suspi-
cion that Daubert motions can be used as a trial strategy. Concerns have
been raised about the Daubert opinion, including the charges that it disad-
vantages plaintiffs and criminal defendants, and that it favors parties with
more resources than their opposition in litigation. Raffensperger and My-
ers, for example, argue that
[ludges are routinely throwing out emerging, incomplete, or
even highly suggestive (though not definitive) evidence and bar-
ring the plaintiffs scientific experts from testifying. The jury
does not hear the testimony. This practice has inevitably favored
corporate defendants.
Tort cases are now often dismissed in summary judgments as a
result of these pretrial proceedings .... 77
Moreover, Wendy Wagner observes that parties
in civil cases are finding that Daubert challenges are expensive to
mount and defend, a feature ... that is a disadvantage to those
with limited resources .... For example, plaintiff attorneys re-
port that the added cost of Daubert hearings not only impacts
their decisions about the types of expert evidence to introduce
but also affects their decisions about which cases to take ....
Similarly . . . [b]ecause counsel for many criminal defendants
provide representation either as a public service or through
under-funded public defenders' offices, most criminal defend-
ants will be unable to finance Daubert challenges. 78
To the extent that these perceived imbalances and resulting injustice
have been caused by Daubert, the rules of professional conduct are not
going to help.
Hypothetically, imagine a defense attorney representing a wealthy cli-
ent (in a lawsuit) who hires an expert who states confidentially that in his
opinion, the plaintiff's experts will present reliable and conventionally
valid scientific testimony, and there is no reliable and conventionally valid
science available to challenge the plaintiffs claim. If the defense attorney
nevertheless brings a Daubert motion to exclude the plaintiffs expert testi-
77. Id. at 6.
78. Wagner, supra note 67, at S103.
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mony, purely as a matter of trial strategy, and asks the defense expert to
manufacture some uncertainty in an expert report, help defense counsel
deconstruct the plaintiff's expert and testify as to some unreasonably high
standard for "sound science" that even the plaintiffs expert cannot meet,
has there been an ethical violation of the rules of professional conduct?
That ought to be the easy case, because we presume that defense counsel
knows that a claim of unreliability is false and that there is no good faith
basis for the motion. But even that analysis is subject to question, because
it depends upon what the defense expert says in response to the request to
help with the motion. If the response is, "I'll do it, but it will all be lies,"
then defense counsel cannot ethically proceed with the Daubert motion
because there is knowledge of falsity. On the other hand, if the expert
responds, "I'll do it, because scientific knowledge is often mistaken and
never certain, and because there are numerous unproven assumptions
and methodological conventions underlying the plaintiffs expert's con-
clusions; and as a scientist, I think we should demand very high levels of
proof before pronouncing causal links." Now, even if defense counsel
doubts the truthfulness of such statement, advocates do not vouch for
their experts and, under the duty of competence, should do the best they
can with whatever "shaky" evidence is available.
If the defense attorney in the above hypothetical prevails in the mo-
tion, it may be because the 'judicial community has displayed a woeful
ignorance of scientific uncertainty."79 Indeed,
ajudge who does not [a] have expertise in dealing with scientific
uncertainty, [b] agree with a particular interpretation, [c] under-
stand the full value or limit of currently used methodologies, or
[d] recognize the hidden assumptions, biases, or strengths of sci-
entific inferences, may reach an incorrect decision on the relia-
bility... of credible evidence .... 80
Or it may be because judges interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence
as "requiring . . . them to apply strict standards to the kind of evidence
presented in courts."8 ' Finally, if a court "is unaware or unconcerned
about the necessity of ... constructed features of science, attacks against
the accepted conventions are likely to succeed." 82 In any event, taking
advantage of the actual conservatism (with respect to conclusions) and un-
certainty of scientists, the actual constructedness of science, and the actual
interpretations by judges of their gate-keeping duties would seem to be
the opposite of bad faith or presenting evidence known to be false.
79. See Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 73, at 4.
80. Ronald L. Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude Essential
Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH S30, S30 (Supp. July
2005).
81. See Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 73, at 6.
82. Wagner, supra note 67, at S102.
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Of course, the idea of taking advantage of a judge who does not un-
derstand Daubert or science is unseemly-recall Steven Lubet's admoni-
tion that attorneys should not take comfort in erroneous judicial rulings,
and that "a minimal level of self-policing" is expected of counsel in such
situations.8 3 On the other hand, Monroe Freedman has argued that lying
to judges is ethically justifiable in some limited situations.84 Freedman
offers the examples of ajudge who improperly asks criminal defense coun-
sel, "Did he do it or didn't he?," and of a judge who confers with counsel
separately, in a compulsory settlement conference in a civil suit, and in-
quires about a client's minimum and maximum settlement figures.8 5 For
purposes of his argument, Freedman predicts that the first judge would
assume guilt if counsel replied, "I cannot ethically answer that question"
or "The defendant pleaded not guilty" or "You should not ask that ques-
tion;" similarly, if the attorney explained to the second judge that his or
her reply should not be taken as an assertion of a material fact (as in settle-
ment negotiations with an adversary), Freedman assumes that the judge
would view the reply as unresponsive and could retaliate in ways that could
be highly prejudicial toward the attorney's client.8 6 Relying on the
"Scope" section of the A.B.A. Rules, which confirms that the model rules
"do not... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should in-
form a lawyer," Freedman maintains that duties to the client, in the face of
a judge who abuses his or her authority, may require "the lawyer to violate
[the] salutary disciplinary rules" against fraud on the tribunal and deceit
in general.8
7
By comparison, imagine a trial judge who, instead of abusing his or
her authority, displays such "a woeful ignorance of scientific uncer-
tainty"8 8 that an opposing expert can be easily attacked in a Daubert hear-
ing by highlighting the constructed features of science. Assuming that
opposing counsel cannot educate the judge, what is wrong with such an
attack? The "lie," or at least misrepresentation, is the pejorative implica-
tion of "constructedness," or the impression that the expert has been dis-
credited. Nevertheless, I doubt that the attorney attacking the opposing
expert has violated the rule against fraud on the tribunal or the rule
against deceit in general, because the attorney has presumably revealed
only the actual constructedness of science, and the attorney's responsibility
is to help a client, not to educate the judiciary.
83. For a further discussion, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84. See Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation: Lying to
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HorsTRA L. Rv. 771,
773-77 (2006).
85. See id. at 773-80.
86. See id. at 773.
87. See id. at 782 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope, at 16
(2004); id. at 772 (discussing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (1) &
8.4(c), which respectively prohibit fraud on tribunal and conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).
88. For a further discussion, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
970 [Vol. 52: p. 953
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss4/8
LEGAL ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
III. INTERDISCIPLINARY ETHICS: THE ANALOGY TO LAWYER
COLLABORATION WITH SOCIAL WORKERS
Some law school clinicians and social workers have identified the ben-
efits of interdisciplinary law practice as well as the ethical challenges of
collaboration between professionals from different fields.89 Specifically,
the "typical unfettered zeal" of an attorney seems to conflict with "the so-
cial worker's commitment to broader social interests," although the per-
ceived tension between the two may be exaggerated.90
While lawyers and social workers may initially approach their
work from different starting points, . . . the collaboration be-
tween the two professions offers the client the potential for an
enhanced exploration of the client's goals and options during a
comprehensive legal counseling session undertaken before the
lawyers embark on their zealous advocacy with third parties.9 1
For example, if a married mother of two children wants a divorce and,
out of spite, wants custody of one of the children who has a close relation-
ship with the father, her lawyer would (typically) zealously pursue her de-
sired outcome.9 2 A social worker involved in the case would (typically)
pursue a client's "best interests and [be] more attentive to the needs of
others around the client."9 3 The tension between the two orientations
might appear to be unworkable, but good lawyering is not exhausted by
the notion of zealous advocacy-A.B.A. Model Rule 2.1 requires that law-
yers "render candid advice," and allows lawyers to refer to "moral, eco-
nomic, [and] social ... factors ... relevant to the client's situation."94
Indeed, a lawyer who neglects to address a client's spiteful goals, which
may not be in the best interest of her child, could be considered
ineffective. 9 5
Moreover,
attorneys have long recognized that they are capable of good-
intentioned, effective manipulation. The problem is not new or
unique to interdisciplinary work. Thus, while collaboration might
increase the risk of attorney manipulation, it is not its root
cause.
96
89. See Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg, & Paul R. Trembly, Professional
Ethics in Interdisciplinary Collaboratives: Zeal, Paternalism and Mandated Report-
ing, 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 659 (2007).
90. See id. at 663.
91. Id. at 664-65.
92. See id. at 666.
93. See id. at 670.
94. See id. at 676.
95. See id. at 676-77.
96. Id. at 690.
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Some, therefore, conclude that complementary professional orienta-
tions and interdisciplinary legal counseling can be "richer and more com-
prehensive" than simply championing a client's initially chosen goal.9 7
Perhaps this model has some applicability to the collaboration be-
tween lawyers and scientists in a lawsuit. The professional orientation of a
scientist is not to be an advocate, and the scientist has a commitment to
interests beyond the lawsuit, such as to scientific accuracy. In some cases,
an expert may not be able to offer the unqualified opinion that a zealous
lawyer and his or her client want. If the lawyer and client decide to drop
the case, their interdisciplinary engagement has arguably enriched their
cause by showing them they should not waste their time. If, in the alterna-
tive, the lawyer interviews other experts until he or she finds one who will
support the claim, the lawyer may reasonably believe that the experts testi-
fying will be shaky and perhaps even false. A.B.A. Rule 3.3(a) (3) gives a
lawyer the discretion to refuse to offer such testimony, for strategic rea-
sons-impliedly because the expert will not help, and may hurt, the cli-
ent's case. 8 Again, the client's case has arguably been enriched by the
(failed) interdisciplinary engagement, and the potential for more effective
lawyering has been realized. Conversely, if a lawyer takes advantage of the
ethical permissions, in the name of advocacy, to present shaky evidence,
the representation may be less effective. There are good reasons, there-
fore, for tempering zealous advocacy in some cases.
IV. CONCLUSION: NOTHING TO BE PROUD OF
The view that the rules of professional conduct require attorneys to
police the reliability of science in the courtroom, albeit compelling on
moral grounds or with reference to social justice, is a minority position
that almost tends toward civil disobedience. We value the "unfairness" of
trial strategies when they represent zealous advocacy, because we believe
in the fairness of a genuinely adversarial process.9 9
In the policy arena, opponents of regulation based on scientific stud-
ies can offer re-analyses of the data supporting those studies, and this
"sometimes results in the existence of what appear to be equal and oppo-
site studies, encouraging policymakers to do nothing in the face of what
appears to be contradictory findings." 100 Trial attorneys can do the same
97. See id. at 717.
98. For a further discussion, see supra note 2 and commentary following
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3.
99. SeeJAsANorr, SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 26, at 52. "Defenders of the
adversary process claim that legal decisions are fairest when the two parties argue
'as unfairly as possible, on opposite sides, for then it is certain that no important
consideration will altogether escape notice.'" Id. (citing Peter Brett, The Implica-
tions of Sciencefor Law, 18 McGILL LJ. 170, 186 (1972) (quoting Lord Thomas Bab-
ington Macaulay)).
100. See Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S45.
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thing, as one of the lawyering techniques offered in trial advocacy training
manuals is the "disagreement of experts" move:
Frequently you will have little ammunition to reduce the effec-
tiveness of the [opposing] expert's testimony. In these situations
the best you can realistically . . . achieve is to level the playing
field. Show that the experts on both sides are essentially equal
and, in effect, cancel themselves out .... This is always a useful
approach whenever the other side's experts are either more im-
pressive or more numerous. 10 1
It is perhaps unfortunate that during a trial, relatively equal numbers of
experts are pitted against each other on the witness stand, giving the possi-
bly false impression that opinion in the larger scientific community is also
similarly divided.102
But we do not blame the attorneys for being unethical-we trust
those attorneys who are negatively affected to correct false impressions,
and we trust judges and juries not to be misled by false impressions.
Those who complain about the dire effects of manufacturing uncer-
tainty, deconstruction of credible science and demands for "sound sci-
ence" almost always identify the source of their effectiveness in an
unrealistic or idealized vision of science on the part of judges (or policy-
makers). For Michaels and Monforton, Daubert allows judges to demand a
level of certainty that science cannot provide, which allows defendants to
magnify and exploit the commonplace uncertainties of science and con-
vince judges "to exclude credible evidence and scientists from court
cases."1 0 3 For Wagner, deconstruction succeeds because judges "do not
respect the vulnerable, socially constructed features of traditional research
methods?" 10 4 (It bears mention that deconstruction by revealing the so-
cially-constructed aspects of science may not work if a judge idealizes sci-
ence, because the judge simply may not believe that scientific claims are
certified "through a multitude of informal, often invisible, negotiations
among members of relevant disciplines" rather than by unmediated access
to physical reality; in that case, deconstruction may still succeed by attack-
ing "the personal credibility of witnesses," and revealing "biases, such as
ties to economic interests.") 10 5 And for Raffensperger and Myers, appeals
to "sound science" only work because some judges have a simplistic vision
of scientific evidence and expertise that is "at odds with scientific conven-
tion." 10 6 Thus we can blame judges who have a pollyannaish view of sci-
101. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 391 (5th ed. 2000).
102. JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 26, at 55.
103. See Michaels and Monforton, supra note 40, at S40, S44.
104. See Wagner, supra note 67, at S102.
105. SeeJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 26, at 52, 211.
106. See Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 73, at 6.
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ence; we can also blame conservative politicians, 10 7 the tobacco (or lead,
or chemical, or asbestos) industries, 10 8 or the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 10 9 or the junk science movement,' 10 or unethical experts,' 1 1 or any-
one else who we might believe is responsible for popularizing an idealized
vision of scientific certitude; and we can even blame lawyers for doing
their jobs-but we cannot justifiably bring formal ethical complaints un-
less lawyers know they are misleading the court with false evidence.
107. See Chris Mooney, Sucker Punch: How Conservatives Are Trying to Use a Con-
flict over Obscure Fish to Gut the Science Behind the Endangered Species Act, LEGAL AF-
FAIRS, May/June 2004, at 23.
108. See Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S40-41.
109. See Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 73, at 2.
110. See Michaels & Monforton, supra note 40, at S43.
111. See id.
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